Ethics— With or Without Religion. by Yarros, Victor S.
ETHICS—WITH OR \MTHOUT RFXIGION
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
MANY books and articles have been written by modernists who
hold that the way to vindicate or reinvigorate Religion is to
prove that, after all, it only inculcates the virtues of love, charity,
mercy. sym]:)athy, and that, therefore, religion is merelv another
name for morality.
In animadverting ujion this species of apologetic literature, a
British critic said recently with impatience, "Commonplace moralitv
is ii()t religion."
Xo. of course not. Commonplace morality is manifestly based
on e.\|)ediency and utility.^ A totally irreligious society—using the
phrase in a con\entional or traditional sense—would need, and en-
force, a commonplace morality not different in any respect from that
of C^hristian or Mohammedan or Ruddhist societies.
i'.ut the question arises: Is the /;/ her morality religion, or, in
other words, is the higher morality possible without a religious basis
and sanction? By the "higher morality" we mean, as does every
body, certain manifestations of .Altruism, such as positive benefi-
cence and self-sacrifice.
'It IS not to he doiiicd tliat even certain .Agnostics fall into the error of
claiming that religion is neither more nor less than ordinary, coinmoni)lace
morality. They (|uote James' words, "Pnre religion and undefiled liefore God
and the h'ather is tlii^. To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction.
and to keep himself unspotted from the world". Or they quote Jesus' "The
Kingdom of God is within you", and his etlrcal commandments and sayings.
What these interpreters overlook is the emphasis on religion in their quota-
tons. The first of all the commandments, according to Jesus, is, "Love the
Lord thy Clod with all thy heart." Neither Jesus nor h's disciples dreamed
of the possihility of divorcing ethics and morality from religion. The father-
hood of Ciod was to them the primary and fundamental doctrine, and w'thout
lo\e and worship of Clod, love or charity for man was to them inconceivahlc.
.And certainly hetween their religion and llirir ethics there was no possihilily
of antagonism, whatever m;iy be the case with corrupt, oh.sole.scent. dogma-
ridden and superstitious religious systems.
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If we take the position that morals and religion are indissolubly
united, no difficulty presents itself, and the highest forms of altru-
ism stand justified and explained. If all men are brothers, and this
brotherhood is based on the fatherhood of God, an omnipotent and
omniscient power ; and if love, service and sacrifice on earth are re-
warded by eternal bliss hereafter, or by the supreme satisfaction
of knowing that in losing one's life, one finds it enhanced a thous-
and fold. then, indeed, no injunction of religion can be considered
to be alien to the potentialities and possibilities of human nature.
But what of the Agnostic? Having divorced morals from
religion ; having affirmed that the phrase "fatherhood of God" is
without meaning to him. the Agnostic is compelled to supply new
sanctions for morality in all its essential aspects. It is, of course,
hardlv necessary to say that there is no such thing as Agnosticism
(though there is relativity) in regard to morals. Societies cannot
live or grow without moral codes adjusted to their realized needs. It
is almost inconceivable that society should permit or tolerate mur-
der, arson, theft, forgerv, rape, libel, malicious mischief, etc. Crimi-
nal codes are primarily moral codes. Even traffic codes are moral
codes, and moral codes, as a rule, are rational. The freedom of any
individual in any civilized state viust be bounded by the equal free-
dom of all other individuals.
In making such affirmations as these we are assuming, of course,
that adequate moral codes are possibl-e without religious sanctions.
What are they?
The Agnostic or skeptic will point, first of all, to utilitarian con-
siderations. He will argue, and rightly, that no rational person will
defend murder, burglary, theft, etc., and, further, that if a society
were formed de novo, on a desert island, by Agnostics, there would
be virtual unanimity in favor of substantially the same moral code as
settled societies follow and enforce. No supernatural or mystical
eLements are required to justify the familiar prohibitions of the
criminal code. Expediency and Hedonism supply all the motives
and sanctions that are necessary.
Two questions, however, arise at this juncture. First, what of
the so-called ahsohitc duties, moral and legal—that is, duties the
performance of which yields no reciprocal benefit? Why, for ex-
ample, should we refrain from inflicting cruelty upon animals
—
creatures not members of our body politic? Or, again, why should
we treat criminals and outcasts of normal intelligence— and there
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arc such, f^occ certain extreme schools of psvchiatry— with humanity
and mercy ? Why should we abolish capital punishment, reform our
prisons, extend parole and prcibation laws to more and more offend-
ers?
The answer of the Hedonist to these queries is likely to be this
:
In sjxirino^ animals, or in progressively humanizing our treatment of
criminals, we are really sparing and pleasing ourselves. The more
civilized we are, the more painful it is to us to contemplate pain
suffered by others, e\en when the pain is deser\'ed. Our higher
nature dictates forbearance, mercy and forgiveness. Hedonism,
accordingly covers absolute duties and mitigation of merited pen-
alties. The second question is more difificult. Tt is this : How can
self-sacrifice be justified on utilitarian or Hedonistic principles?
\\h\ shoidd anvone give up his life for the sake of an idea or a
cause? By what right does the secular or Agnostic state send men
to their death contrary to their own will and their own conception
of self-interest?
Herbert Spencer grappled with these difficulties. We know
what his solution was. He believed in the transmission by physical
or biological inheritance of certain acquired characters, as well as in
the operation in societies of the factor of natural selection. He was
convinced—though on what we now see was rather inadequate evi
dence—that man has long been gradually adjusting himself, and
being adjusted by unconscious evolution, to the completely social life.
He believed that there has been, and that there will continue to be,
evolution in human sentiments and emotions. He believed that the
apparent, and for a time real, opposition between Egoism and Altru-
ism was slowly disappearing, and that ultimately "due egoism"
will be achieved by giving pleasure and ser\ice to others. Because
of the postulated social and moral evolution, according to Spencer—
"What n(i\v is occasional and feeble even in men of the highest na-
ture may be expected to become habitual and strong, and what now
characterizes the exceptionally high may be expected eventually to
characterize' all. Imh' thai which the best human nature is capable
of, is within the reach nf human nature at large."
Now, the li.cst Innnan ualure is capable nf self-sacrifice and oi
(Iclilici-atc nnscllisli assumption of the gravest risks. Indeed, in the
hest natures self-sacrifice is spontaneous, not the result of cold
calculations and balancing of advantages .and (lis.uhantages. There-
fore, oil tlic thcorv of iiKK-liiiitr pcrft'iM iliilit \- and iqtward develop-
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ment. even the averag^e human being- will in time achieve the ca-
pacity of self-sacrifice. To be sure, Spencer pauses to observe, in
a harmonious and full-grown society the occasions for anything like
serious self-sacrifice will be infrequent, since .extensive demands
on the superior, the benevolent and the altruistic members of so-
ciety presuppose much misery, in justice and unhappin-ess, and these
conditions argue grevious lack of adaptation to a IJruly social
state. Still, he contends, the rare occasions for sacrifice will pro-
duce keen competition for the privilege, as the satisfaction of the
impulse to sacrifice will be very highly prized.
This reasoning, however, involves some question-begging. Why
docs moral or social evolution tend to produce capacity for self-
sacrifice. Because, the answer must be, it is impossible for societies
or nations to survive and flourish without that asset. In the strug-
gle for existence the societies whose members lacked that impulse
and capacity, the theory is, would decline and pevish, while the more
fortunate societies, whose members were ready to make all manner
of sacrifices for the general good, not excepting the sacrifice of life,
would grow strong and possess the earth.
But has there ever been such competition among tribes and
states? Has any society permitted men to refuse to make sacri-
fices for the general good ? No nation or state is willing, or ever was
willing, to live by voluntar}' taxation, for example, or to relinquish
war-time conscription. No state has ever recognized what Spencer,
in his radical days, called " the right of the individual to secede",
to refuse to pay taxes or serve in the army or navy, or in the
militia, when called upon to do so. We are assured by some sociolo-
gists that the state would be stronger if it did respect the scruples
of non-resistants and pacifists and exempted them from services
they conscientiously disapproved of. W^e are told that the free
state would be so dear and sacred to fre.e men that they would rush
chivalrously to its defense whenever it was threatened by less noble
or enlightened states. There is some truth in this, but exactly how
much? No one can know.
What is certain is this—that the duty of the individual to serve
the state at any risk or cost to himself is, and has been for ages,
inculcated by the churches, the statesmen, the moralists, the edu-
cators, the politicians and the publicists of all schools, as well as by
the artists. The pressure of the social atmosphere is all but ir-
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resistible. Men feci that they have practically no choice. The com-
pulsion of the law is supi)lemented by that of public opinion.
Only in recent years has the doctrine been promulgated by so-
cial radicals that the state must deserve service and sacrifice, and
that the immoral or despotic state, or the wasteful and inefficient
state, has no real claim on the individual citizen. This doctrine of
the moral basis of the state is, however, purely academic. In prac-
tice every state appeals to force as the last resort, and is almost uni-
versally upheld in that course. ]\Ien instinctively bow to the state
and admit its right to rule and to require of them any sacrifice it may
deem necessary. Individuals may question and assail the state's
policies : they may regard the sacrifices demanded of them in war
time, or in times of internal stress and danger, as unfair and vain.
They may charge the state with blunders and crimes, and attribute
these to the egotism, vanity, ignorance or malice of men clothed
with brief authority. (But who can doubt that "My country right
or wrong" is the perfectly spontaneous doctrine of most men, of
nearly all men, in fact?
Can reason, logic, expediency, utilitv account for this attitude,
or must the explanation for it be sought in mystical and super-
rational or non-rational elements?
Let us see how a great philosopher, Spinoza, dealt with the
issues we have raised, and especially with the sanctions of ethics
and the relation between the individual citizen and the state. Of
course. Spinoza was a profoundly religious thinker and not a Hedon-
ist or utilitarian. Yet how does he fashion or justify his system
of Ethics? Does he invoke mystical sanctions? Does he treat the
supremacy of the state and of law as corollaries of the Fatherhood of
God and of the divine governance of the human world? By no
means.
Spinoza, in the fourth section of his Ethics, proceeds almost as
the Greek philosophers did or as the English radical utilitarians did.
Tie knows that concc])tions of right and wrong, good aiid bad, in
conduct arc the foundations of morality. He begins, therefore,
with definitions of good and bad, and his definitions are very modern
and Hedonistic.
"Good." he says, "is that which we certainly know to be useful
to us," and "bad that which we certainlv know will prevent us from
partaking of any good." By "us", we must assiune. Spinoza mean.s
those of us who are normal mentally and emoticMially, and whose
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firm and mature, or certain, judgments commend themselv.es to the
great majority of reasonable and well-balanced human beings.
Again : "The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than
the .emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious of it."
"Since," continues Spinoza, "man endeavors to persist in his
being and to avoid pain and experience pleasure, what does reason
tell him as to the means of realizing the maximum of possible happi-
ness?" His answer is elaborate, but we may condense it as follows:
Reason postulates that each man should love himself and seek
what is truly useful to him ; that each should desire whatever leads
to a state of perfection. The basis of virtue is in action in accord-
ance with the laws of one's nature, or the endeavor to preserve
what is one's o^^'n. Since, however, we cannot be happpy without
possessing many desired things that are without us, virtue and hap-
])iness cannot be achieved in isolation and in narrow self-indulgence.
Now, there is nothing more useful to man than man. Nothing,
therefore, can be desired by men more excellent for their self-
preservation than that all with all should so agree that they com-
pose the minds of all into one mind, and all seek at the same time
what is useful to them all as a body. Under the guidance of reason
then, men would desire nothing for themselves which thev do not
also desire for the rest of mankind, and therefore they would be
just, faithful and honorable. Even hatred and injustice should be
repaid with love and charity, for minds are conquered not bv arms,
but by love and magnanimity. And, although men are too often
governed bv evil passions rather than by reason, they cannot fail
to recognize that they derive more advantages than disadvantages
from society, and therefore it is right and wise to bear injuries with
equanimity and to promote only the institutions, customs and ways
which tend to produce social harmony and social peace.
It will be seen that Spinoza finds no need for mystical, non-
rational, supernatural elements in his ethical system. Utilitarian
considerations answer every purpose of the social contract. But so
for. it should be noted, there is no mention of any real self-sacrifice.
Spinoza speaks of bearing certain injuries with equanimity, because
the advantages conferred by organized society outweigh any ordi-
nary disadvantages—for exmple, errors of justice, or weakness and
negligence in administration, or failure to protect a particular group
against sporadic mob violence—and because an individual would
los.e infinitely more than he could gain by seceding from society,
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assiimin<x that he had that alternative. But what of ^ivino- one's life
for the good of society and at its command ? Spinoza avoids this
question, perhaps because in his day it hardly presented itself. Yet
some of his remarks furnish a clue to his logical answer thereto.
He goes on to argue that men. because of their passions, appetites
and short-sightedness, can only be made to refrain from inflicting
evil by threats of greater evil. Society or the state does this ; it
prohibits certain courses of conduct and punishes them; it -enforces
obedience to law^ by threats, not by appeals to reason. The citizen,
then, must feel that such obedience is necessary. In fact, "sin be-
comes nothing else than disobedience, and is punishable by right of
the state alone," says Spinoza.
It niav be inferred from this reasoning that it is ihe duty
of the citizen to ob-ey an order of the state even ii'hcii it means risk-
inc/ or losing his life. Without obedience, Spinoza says, the state
is insecure and weak. It is, for the State, therefore, to determine
when, or whether, ])erils facing it are of a character and degree to
demand self-sacrifice of its members.
Thus it may be contended that, in advocating obedience to the
law and the state, and therefore to those who at any given time
authorativelv speak for the State, Spinoza did contemplate sacrifice
as one of the obligations assumed by the tacit social contract, or by
memberslii]) in organized society.
Spinoza, however, overlooks the fact that obedience to authoritv
is not alxvays a sin, but, on the contrary, may be a virtue. There
may be a contlict between one's own sense of right, one's own rea-
son and conscience, and the command of authority. History is re-
plete with such instances. From Socrates down to the Abolitionists
and the conscientious objectors, men of rectitude, courage and con-
viction have maintained that morality may be superior to law and
in ad\ance of it. They have accepted the consequences of dis-
obedience, but neither thcv nor their thoughtful fellow-citizens have
regarded them as simiers or criminals. Here is a seeming paradox,
but the truth is that self-sacrificing de\otion to truth, to duty as
one conceives it, to an ideal, in short, is nol)ler and more courageous
than self-sacriiice, at the command of authority, for the common
good as interpreted by that authority. We may be sure that Spinoza,
if lie were writing to(la\-, would draw a distinction between organic
societ\- and the political state, and another distinction between self-
sacrifice for the welfare of society as one conceives it and self-sac-
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rifice at the command of ofificers and functionaries who happen to
wield power for a time. Tn other words, obedience to one's own
still, small voice, to one's own sense of rig^ht, is often a higher vir-
tue than obedience to the state.
But obedience, self-subordination, sacrifice, altruism in the high-
est form, are indispensable to society and to human progress. The
philosophic utilitarian concedes this in theory as fully as the evo-
lutionist of mystical proclivities.
It must be admitted that the mystic and theologian are entitled
to argue that the Agnostic Hedonist is interpreting history to suit
his preconceived theory, and that it is impossible to prove that altru-
ism in its highest forms or degrees would have evolved in a society
totally untouched by mysticism and religion. On the other hand, it
is equally open to the Agnostic and Hedonist to assert that, at
bottom, not faith in any supernatural factors, nor fear of divine
wrath, not yearning for divine love, not r-eligion, in a word, but
human needs and conditions, human emotions and sentiments born
of struggle and competition, satisfactorily account for altruism and
sacrifice. One may doubt whether this controversy will ever be
terminated by agreement.
What the Agnostic and the philosophic Hedonist will never con-
cede, however, is the claim that without a religious sanction or -ex-
planation social and individual morality are of necessity reduced to
the lowest and simplest forms. It is sufficient to refer to Spinoza's
line of argument for a refutation of that contention. And to say, as
some did of the English Utilitarians, that they were finer than their
creeds, was merely to indulge in shallow, cheap sneers and patent
fallacies. Men of all creeds, and no creeds, have been fine and noble.
Men build creeds, in the first place, although good and fine creeds
play a part in making and improving men. In the making and re-
making of creeds reason plays the controlling part, though it gives
full weight to sentiments and emotions. It is an egregious error to
treat reason and calculation as synonymous terms. It is a graver
mistake to belittle reason.
In a recent book. Prof. Maurice Hutton, of Toronto University,
discusses the relative importance of reason and conscious Hedonism,
on the one hand, and religious mvsticism or intuition, on the other.
To quote a few typical sentences
:
"If a man must be governed by understanding, it will be by the
understanding* of the lower things of life, for the highest things
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pass understanding^ : of peace (true peace), of righteousness, of
\\"isdom a man has a suspicion, a vision, a .s^leam, a divination, as
Plato says, but not yet comprehension : 'through a glass darkly'
he sees, if at all. And therefore the demand that life be based upon
logic, reason and comprehension inevitably sinks into a basing of
life on that common sense 'which is intolerable without metaphysics',
on that hors-e sense which is only one degree, I apprehend, removed
from jackass sense, and on materialism."
Prof. Hutton asserts that in the great and important actions men
are governed, not by reason, but by the indwelling sense of duty,
and that, pace the Greek thinkers, knowledge is not and cannot beget
virtue. The virtuous man does his duty because of a categorical
and intuitive imperative, not because he discerns any personal ad-
vantage to himself in performance of dutv.
These assertions contain a small element of truth, but only a
small element. Psychologists and scientific ethicists do not admit
that reason supplies no warrant or sanction for acts of justice, of
beneficence, of altruism. There is joy and personal satisfaction
in service ; there is, as Spencer contended, pleasure in sharing pleas-
ure. There is self-realization and self-expression in what may
appear unselfish service. And even when real sacrifice is demanded,
reason—not "horse sense," to be sure, but reflective reason—has
no difficulty in accounting for the readiness to make such sacrifice
and for the spontaneous impulse to sacrifice.
To afiirm that reason cannot justify great actions, nobility of
conduct, and that the attempt to follow it leads one straight to crude
egotism and crass materialism, is to denv. bv implicatiim, that
civilization enriches the individual and makes him freer, better and
worthier than he could possibly be in a "state of nature", with its
risks, perils and suft'erings.
Our conclusion is two-fold. In the first j^lace, service, altruism,
sacrifice are facts, not m-ere ]>ossibilties. P.eing facts, reason and
science must account for them. In the second place, the theory
of social evolutidii docs furnish a satisfactory explanation of those
facts. Social evolution, obviouslv. might and should produce jus-
tice, bent-tkx'ncc and altrnisin, even if ni\stioisni had never dominated
the minds of men. .Xnd the evolutionary theory of social morality
is strengthened by the abstract argument from utility prc^perly un-
derstood, as S])inoza, for example, understood it.
We do not know what the religion of the futiu-e will be. We
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know that science is modifyin,^ religion and purging it of childish
superstitions and of verbal, meaningless terms. But we know also
that science fortifies social morality instead of undernvining it; that
science urges sobriety, temperence, tolerance, humility, industry,
co-operation, solidarity, sympathy, respect for personality, release
and development of human faculties.
And these are of the essence of social morality. They can dis-
pense with the prop of mysticism and dogma, as can science.
